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Articles
Defining a "Security" After the
Forman Decision
JOHN DEACON* AND JAMES D. PRENDERGAST**
With the 1975 decision of United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man,' the United States Supreme Court coalesced twenty-nine years of
judicial decisions prescribing methodology for defining a security for
the purposes of federal law. In enunciating the criteria to be used in
defining a security, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the factors set forth
in SEC v. .J Howey Co. ;2 namely, (1) an investment of money, (2) in
a common enterprise, and (3) the expectation of profits from the en-
trepreneurial efforts of others. Moreover, in determining the existence
of the foregoing elements requisite to finding a security, courts are to be
guided by an "economic realities" standard; that is, form is always to
be discarded and the court is to look to the substance of the transaction
when deciding the applicability of the federal securities laws. To this
end, the Forman decision rejects any literal test for determining what is
* B.A., 1964, J.D., 1967, University of Southern California. Member, California State Bar.
Partner, Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, Los Angeles, California.
** B.A., 1965, M.B.A., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1974, Hastings College
of the Law. Member, California State Bar. Partner, Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, Los Angeles,
California.
1. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
2. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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a security and, furthermore, announces a test that is to be universally
applicable to defining securities.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in the recent case of
United Caiffornia Bank v. THC Financial Corp.,3 considered Forman's
combination of the "economic realities" standard with the required ex-
pectation of profits from the entrepreneurial efforts of others as that
Circuit's "risk capital" test.4 In footnote 9 of the THC opinion, the
court stated that the "risk capital" standard was first employed by the
California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals assumes that the "risk capi-
tal" test announced by the California Supreme Court in Sobieski sur-
vives the Forman decision and, consequently, remains a viable
standard by which the applicability of the federal securities laws may
be determined.
The Sobieski formulation compels the finding of a security if there is
any expectation of valuable benefit to the provider of risk capital.' For-
man, however, requires prqfit in a traditional sense as "capital appreci-
ation resulting from the development of the initial investment. . . or a
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds
. . .. "I Thus, Forman and Sobieski are distinguishable on the basis of
risk and on the basis of profit expectation.
It is the contention of the authors that Forman should not be viewed
as a federal "risk capital" test, but rather as a "venture capital" test.
This subtle distinction between "risk capital" and "venture capital"
leads to a better understanding of the trend in judicial decisions regard-
ing securities and, further, demonstrates that while the Sobieski formu-
lation of "risk of loss" may be of some evidentiary value, Sobieski is
not incorporated in what may be termed the "Howey/Forman" test. In
order to explain more clearly the distinction between the
Howey/Forman test and Sobieski, however, it will be beneficial to trace
briefly the historical background of judicial decisions preceding the
Forman decision.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to 1933, securities regulation was the exclusive province of the
states. As a result, Congress borrowed freely from the states' "Blue
Sky" laws in defining the term "security" for the purpose of the Securi-
3. 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. Id. at 1358; see Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
5. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
6. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
7. 421 U.S. at 852.
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ties Act of 1933.8 In addition, both the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
19349 (hereinafter referred to as the Securities Exchange Act) define
security "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within
the definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary scope of securities."'° The "broad and
general" terms used by Congress did little more than express the intent
that transactions in "securities," whatever that nebulous term may
mean, were to be regulated. It was left to the courts, therefore, to define
more clearly what constituted a security.
Ten years after the promulgation of the Securities Act, the Supreme
Court in SEC v. CM Joiner Leasing Corp. " issued its first opinion on
the intrepretation of this definitional language. The case involved a
program to sell oil leases, accompanied by representations that the de-
fendants would drill a test well that would prove the productivity of the
vendees' acreage. In response to defendants' arguments that this was
merely an offer of "naked leasehold rights," Mr. Justice Jackson ob-
served:
The drilling of this well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled
phenomenon to which salesmen pointed merely to show the pos-
sibilities of the offered leases. The exploration enterprise was woven
into these leaseholds, in both an economic and a legal sense; the un-
dertaking to drill a well runs through the whole transaction as the
thread on which everybody's beads were strung.
12
Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized the underlying purpose of the Secur-
ities Act:
It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling undertak-
ing was what brought into being the instruments that defendants
were selling and gave to the instruments most of their value and all
8. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976). The Securities Act of 1933 in turn became the
model for the definitional section of the Uniform Securities Act, Section 40 1(1), which has been
adopted in one form or another in 25 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See 6
UNIF. LAWS ANN. 691 (Master ed. 1970).
9. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1976).
10. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), provides:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term security means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, or in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Compare 15 U.S.C. §77b (1976) (Securities Act of 1933) with 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10) (1976) (Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934).
11. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
12. Id. at 348.
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of their lure. The trading in these documents had all the evils inher-
ent in the securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securi-
ties Act to end.
13
In reversing the lower court, Mr. Justice Jackson refused to be bound
by a specific formula in defining the term "investment contract."
Rather, he followed the lead of prior state and federal decisions and
chose to place his holding on general policy grounds, suggesting a case-
by-case analysis.
14
Three years after the Joiner decision, the Supreme Court decided the
Howey case, which involved the sale of citrus acreage accompanied by
an option to purchase service contracts that obligated an affiliated cor-
poration to cultivate and market the fruit. As in Joiner, it was imprac-
tical for the purchasers to participate in the development of their own
land because of their lack of sophistication, absenteeism and the eco-
nomic difficulties of piecemeal farming. Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking
for the majority, chose to isolate those elements which in his opinion
were the distinguishing features of an investment contract. Noting that
Congress had been influenced by the prior Blue Sky laws, Mr. Justice
Murphy purported to rely upon state decisions to fashion a test that, he
concluded, was consistent with the statutory aims:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby [I] a person invests his
money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being im-
material whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assests employed
by the enterprise.' 5
This sentence quickly became the three-part standard (or by splitting
the third element into a profit expectation and a reliance factor, a four-
part standard) for judging whether a particular transaction involved an
"investment contract." Later decisions have rarely, if ever, construed
the existence of an investment contract without considering, if not for-
mally relying upon, the Howey formula.
13. Id. at 349.
14. The test rather is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the
offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect. In the
enforcement of an act such as this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as
being what they were represented to be. Id. at 352-53. As the Supreme Court noted in Forman,
the contrary may also be true:
[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.
421 U.S. at 849, citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). See
generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
15. 328 U.S. at 298-99; see Great Western Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1976).
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THE FORMAN DECISION
Twenty-nine years elapsed between the Howey and Forman deci-
sions. During that period, the federal courts developed a number of
levels of analysis to determine whether a transaction constituted a se-
curity. The simplest level is the "literal" test; that is, a transaction is a
security because, on its face, it seems to fall under one of the elements
of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act. When the courts find this test
insufficient, they move to an "economic realities" analysis, another
name for substance over form. Relying upon the intent of Congress
that securities transactions are economic in character, this analysis
seeks to determine whether those complex transactions which may
come under the language of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act, fall
within the regulatory purpose of the Securities Act. In certain contexts,
such as promissory notes or commercial versus investment paper, the
economic realities standard has been denominated the commer-
cial/consumer-investment dichotomy by the courts. 6 Alternatively, in
evaluating investment contract securities under Section 2(1) of the Se-
curities Act, the Howey test becomes the accepted methodology. Thus
Howey was used to analyze investment contract securities; and the "ec-
onomic realities" standard or the commercial/consumer-investment di-
chotomy was used to analyze other types of securities under Section
2(1) of the Securities Act.
The Forman decision reviewed all of these tests in the context of
shares in a cooperative housing project. The case involved tenants of
apartments owned by a nonprofit housing cooperative, who brought a
class action against various defendants, including the corporation
which had issued shares of stock entitling them to lease the apartments.
The complaint alleged that the tenants were misled in their purchase of
the shares by misrepresentation in the cooperative's information bulle-
tin. On this basis they asserted claims for fraud under the Securities
Act and the Securities Exchange Act. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that the shares of stock purchased from the cooperative did not
constitute "securities" within the purview of the federal securities laws.
The Forman decision is significant in that the Supreme Court com-
bined under one definitional standard the analysis of both "investment
contract" securities and other types of securities as defined in Section
2(1) of the Securities Act. In analyzing whether or not the stock in the
cooperative constituted a security for the purposes of federal law, the
Supreme Court stated that it perceived no distinction between an "in-
16. 532 F.2d at 1257.
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vestment contract" and an "instrument commonly known as a 'secur-
ity'" and that the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."' 7 The
Court went on to state that in either case, the basic test for distinguish-
ing a security transaction from commercial dealings is "whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with
profits to come solely from the efforts of others."'"
In deciding that the Howey test had universal application, the
Supreme Court rejected the literal approach to analyzing transac-
tions, 9 and approved the "economic realities" test. As stated by the
Court:
Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress
intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic
realities underlying a transaction, not on the name appended
thereto.2°
Therefore, if the Howey test fits an analysis of a given transaction,
the Howey test is to be used. In the alternative, if a transaction does
not fit the language of the first two elements of Howey, an "economic
realities" standard is to be applied to determine whether the transaction
is of the type Congress intended to bring within the purview of the
Securities Acts. Yet the "economic realities" standard is only useful in
analyzing those schemes that cannot be effectively analyzed under the
concepts of investment and common enterprise. A security cannot be
found under the "economic realities" standard absent a profit expecta-
tion in reliance upon the efforts of others, the third element of Howe),
that must be present. The Forman decision, however, provides several
guideposts to be used to arrive at a better understanding of the
Howey/Forman test.
First, the Forman Court re-emphasized the opinion of Tcherepnin v.
Knight2 which held: "[In searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality."22 The Court, for
example, reiterated the congressional purpose underlining the securities
laws; that is, Congress intended the application of the securities laws
"to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on
the name appended thereto."2 Thus, the Forman Court rejected a lit-
17. 421 U.S. at 852. See also Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979).
18. 421 U.S. at 852, citing SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 301.
19. See 421 U.S. at 848.
20. Id. at 849.
21. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
22. Id. at 336.
23. The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in
a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital markets
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eral analysis for determining whether a particular transaction is within
the ambit of the federal securities laws.
The second and perhaps the major interpretive guide provided by
the Forman Court was a definition of "profits" in the Howey test. In
commenting on the Howey decision, the majority held, over the dissent
of Mr. Justice White, that the touchstone of the definition of a security
...is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the court has
meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of
the initial investment, as in Joiner. . .(sale of oil leases conditioned
upon promoters' agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participa-
tion in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in
Tcherevnin. . .(dividends on the investment based on savings and
loan association's profits). In such cases the investor is "attracted
solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. . . .By con-
trast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume
the item purchased--"to occupy the land or to develop it them-
selves," as the Howey court put it,- . . the securities laws do not
apply.24
One of the findings of the lower court, in concluding that the factual
context in Forman met the test of Howey, was that "an expectation of
income" included the deductibility for tax purposes of the interest on
the mortgage in the cooperative apartment. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that there is no basis in law for the view that the payment of
interest, with its consequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes
income or profits.25 The Court went on to state that "even if these tax
deductions were considered profits, they would not be the type associ-
ated with a security investment since they do not result from the mana-
gerial efforts of others."26
Third, the Forman Court noted that the respondents urged it to
abandon the element of profits in the definition of securities and to
adopt the "risk capital" approach articulated by the Supreme Court of
California in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.27 The Court did not
reject, but declined to adopt, the test of Sobieski. The Court went on to
of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent
fraud and to protect the interest of investors. Because securities transactions are eco-
nomic in character, Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the
economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.
421 U.S. at 849.
24. Id. at 852-53 n.20 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 855.
26. Id.
27. Id. n.24; 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
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say that even if it were inclined to adopt a "risk capital" approach, it
would not apply in the Forman case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-
op City in fact took no risk in any significant sense. If the purchasers
were dissatisfied with their apartments, apparently they had the right to
recover their initial investment in full. The result was no risk of loss of
initial investment.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's failure to reject ex-
pressly the "risk capital" test originated in the Sobieski decision, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the "risk capital" test
remains a viable standard by which to determine the existence of a
security. Therefore, in order to distinguish the Howey/Forman test
from the "risk capital" test, it is necessary to examine the California
Supreme Court's decision in the Sobiesli case.
CALIFORNIA'S RISK CAPITAL TEST
The "risk capital" standard was first employed by the California
Supreme Court in Sobieski.28 Sobieski involved the capitalization of a
country club through advance payments by members to finance con-
struction. The question before the California Supreme Court was
whether the interest in the country club constituted a "security" under
Section 25008 of the California Corporations Code. The Sobieski court
held that Section 25008 defined a security broadly to protect the public
against spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, to attract risk
capital. In order to effect this purpose, the courts in California look
through form to substance.
Under Section 25008, a security is defined as, among other things,
any beneficial interest entitled to property, profits, or earnings. The
Sobieski court held that the purchaser of a membership in the country
club had a contractual right to use the club facilities that could not be
revoked except for his own misbehavior or failure to pay dues. Such an
irrevocable right qualified as a beneficial interest entitled to property
within the literal language of subsection (a) of Section 25008. The
court went on to hold that the petitioners were soliciting risk capital to
develop a business for profit. The purchaser's risk was not lessened
28. The risk capital test has since been adopted in Hawaii, Alaska, Oregon, Washington,
Oklahoma, and perhaps Idaho. See generally Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642,
485 P.2d 105 (1971); Oregon ex. re. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., 5 Or. App. 19,482 P.2d 549
(1971); Alaska Securities Act §45.55.130(12), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 6013; OKLA. STAT.1971,
§2(19)(P), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 39,102; WASH. REV. CODn §21.20.005(12). Idaho may
have the "risk capital" test if a 1972 decision of that state's trial court stands review by higher
judicial authority. See Idaho v. Glenn Turner, Civil Action No. 47773, 4th Judicial District. The
explicit use of "risk" criteria as a means to define a "security" can be found at least as early as the
1930's. See Brownie Oil Co. of Wisc. v. Railroad Comm'n of Wisc., 207 Wis. 88, 93, 240 N.W.
827, 829 (1932).
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merely because the interest he purchased was labeled a membership.
Only because he risks his capital along with other purchasers can there
be any chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize.
The Sobieski court noted that the California definition of security
extended even to transactions where capital is placed without expecta-
tion of any material benefit. Thus, from its exemption of the securities
of certain nonprofit companies, Section 25102 of the Corporations
Code specifically excepted "notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidence
of indebtedness whether interest-bearing or not.'" 2 9 The court then con-
cluded:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test
of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to
afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing
their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a
return on their capital in one form or another.
30
Although Sobieski did not directly consider the importance of the
criteria of managerial efforts of others in analyzing whether the club
membership constituted a security, it should be recognized that reliance
on the efforts of others is presupposed under the Sobieski analysis.
Nevertheless, Sobieski and Forman are at odds over the concept of
profits. What Sobieski does stand for is that capital, subject to risk and
invested with the expectation of "any" material benefit is sufficient to
characterize a transaction as a security under California law. The ben-
efit of membership in a club, that results in neither capital appreciation
nor earnings derived from the use of investors' funds, does not result in
a security under federal law.
The requirement of risk as a necessary element of Sobieski was made
extremely clear in the California Court of Appeal case of Hamilton
Jewelers v. Department of Corporations.1 In this case, the Court of Ap-
peal rejected the contention of the California Department of Corpora-
tions that an advertisement offering certain unmounted diamonds
together with a guarantee of return of the purchase price with interest
at any time the customer might elect within three years of his purchase,
constituted the offer of a security within the meaning of the California
statute, in the form of an "evidence of indebtedness" or "investment
contract." The Court of Appeal pointed out that the "risk capital" ap-
proach is followed in California in ascertaining whether a transaction
involves a security within the meaning of the California Corporate Se-
curities Law. Relying on the trial court's finding of the fair market
29. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
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value of the gems if sold without the full refund-plus interest warranty,
the Court of Appeal held that the customer, being adequately secured,
would have placed no "risk capital" with the seller of the diamonds.
Therefore, the transaction would not come within the regulatory pur-
pose of the California statutes, even though the advertised interest
might ultimately be paid.
The Hamilton Jewelers case is probably a misstatement of California
law, because the "risk capital" theory of Sobieski is not the only test
utilized in California in determining whether a transaction involves the
offer or sale of a security. California has adopted the Howey test in
determining whether an "investment contract" security is present under
the California definition of a security.32 It is arguable that under
Howey, the Hamilton Jewelers repurchase program would have consti-
tuted an investment contract security. Nevertheless, the Hamilton Jew-
elers case is useful in demonstrating that "risk of loss" is necessary to
the finding of a security under Sobieski. The "risk capital" test is a
distinct test from the Howey/Forman test and will find a security in
those cases where there is risk to the provider of capital even though
the provider of capital may not be investing in a common enterprise, or
the provider of capital is not seeking profits as defined in Forman from
the efforts of others.
Therefore, Howey and Sobieski might be considered complementary
decisions. Where there is risk of loss coupled with the expectation of
profit as required by Forman, both tests reach the same results. Where
the investment involves no risk to the investor, Sobieski will not find a
security, but the lack of a risk of loss will not preclude a securities de-
termination under Howey/Forman. Where the investment return takes
the form of a valuable but nonmaterial benefit, the substance of the
scheme determines if it violates the criteria of Sobieski. The absence of
a traditional profit motivation, however, will preclude a securities con-
clusion under the Howey/Forman test. Further, where the scheme con-
tains none of the characteristics of investment return, for example in
the case of retail trading stamps, neither case law nor policy considera-
tions will sustain a securities theory under either Howey/Forman or
Sobieski.
Sobieski, however, does not stand for the proposition that an unqual-
ified expectation of a valuable benefit alone is sufficient to constitute an
investment contract and thereby to completely circumvent the profit
element of Howey. The reason that such an analysis must fail is easily
seen when Howey, absent the profit element, is extended to its logical
32. See People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768-69, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951).
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conclusion. Whenever a customer of an enterprise is promised some
future performance, the fulfillment of that promise necessarily rests
upon the willingness and capability of the promisor to perform. If the
valuable benefit concept were adopted indiscriminately, it would be
tantamount to extending the securities acts to virtually every executory
contract. Importantly, Sobieski did not involve every risk contingency
found in executory contracts, but was limited to risks attendant to ven-
ture capital offerings.
In conclusion, the major difference between Howey/Forman and So-
bieski is that under the federal standard the expectation of profit is
defined in the traditional sense of capital appreciation resulting from
the development of the initial investment or a participation in earnings
resulting from the use of investors' funds. Sobieski goes beyond this
definition to conclude that any valuable benefit in the context of a ven-
ture capital offering, such as membership in a country club, will result
in a security under California law.
Further, as highlighted by the Hamilton Jewelers decision, Sobieski
requires risk of loss to the provider of capital. The Howey/Forman
test, on the other hand, does not require a risk of loss but rather an
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial efforts of
others. If there is economic risk under Howey/Forman, it is the risk
associated with denial of expected gain because control of the venture
is in the hands of others. Although risk of loss is an important analyti-
cal element under the economic realities standard, it is not a necessary
element to the Howey/Forman test. In most cases where the
Howey/Forman test elicits the finding of a security, risk of loss will be
present.
The inquiry under Howey/Forman is whether the provider of funds
is expecting profits from the common enterprise and whether the ven-
ture is in the control of others. These factors are necessary to distin-
guish a venture capital transaction from a commercial transaction
where the provider of funds is seeking a return on the money lent
rather than profit expectation from the success of the enterprise. There-
fore, the Howey/Forman test might be denominated a "venture capi-
tal" test rather than a "risk capital" test as stated in the THC case.
Furthermore, an analysis of the elements of the Howey/Forman test
reinforces the conclusion that Forman adopts a "venture capital" test
for the purpose of federal law.
RISK AND RELIANCE UPON THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS
Although not discarding "risk of loss" as an analytical element, the
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Howey/Forman test requires a finding of a profit expectation coupled
with a reliance by the investor on the efforts of others, notwithstanding
risk of loss. But risk of loss is not the only type of economic risk pres-
ent in a securities transaction. The third element of Howey, adopted in
Forman, analyzes risk as an opportunity cost to the investor. The in-
vestor, because he is relying on others for his profit realization, is pro-
viding funds to an enterprise in which he has no effective control over
success or failure. The third element of Howey focuses on this invest-
ment without corresponding control. The risk to the investor enunci-
ated in Forman is not risk of loss of his initial investment but the risk of
denial of gain because control is exercised by others.
Given a profit expectation as defined by the Supreme Court, if the
managerial decisions leading to the success of the venture are the pre-
rogative of the investor or the success of the venture is not dependent
on managerial effort even if the venture entails risk of loss, the
Howey/Forman test will conclude that a security is not present. If the
significant managerial efforts that determine the success of the venture
are substantially in the hands of a third party or the promoter and there
is a profit expectation, then the Howey/Forman test will find a security
present. This conclusion will stand even if there is no "risk of loss" to
the investor, e.g., a guaranteed repurchase by the promoter, for the
analysis turns not on risk but on whether there is a profit expectation
from the efforts of others.3
It is the emphasis on "profit" expectation from the efforts of others,
without a requirement of risk of loss, that is the basis of the
Howey/Forman test and which permits the economic realities standard
to distinguish between commercial and investment transactions. A
short term loan to a risky borrower is normally not a security. Al-
though Section 2(1) of the Securities Act includes "note" as a security,
the prefatory language limits application to the "context" of the trans-
action. Although a short term risky loan arguably involves, under a
broad definition,34 an investment of money in a common enterprise
with a profit expectation, the profit expectation is normally not the type
of expectation interest that Howey meant to include. This is the key to
the commercial/investment dichotomy.
The distinction between risk capital and venture capital is found in
33. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letters entitled Kelly & Associates Worm, Inc., available De-
cember 15, 1978; Jewelers Vigilance Committee, Inc., available September 30, 1977; and Troy
Associates Ltd., available December 23, 1976.
34. This illustration assumes that vertical commonality is equivalent to common enterprise.
The federal courts are divided on this point. For a discussion of horizontal and vertical common-
ality as it relates to common enterprise, see generally Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1978); Troyer v. Karcagi, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,929 (S.D.N.Y.).
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the difference between the simple risk of loss of money lent and the risk
associated with the contribution of capital to a venture. Risk in the
commercial context can be a function of innumerable criteria, from
general market conditions to collateral base, financial ability to repay,
and interest rates. Risk in a venture capital context is the risk of invest-
ment in an enterprise with return dependent on the success of the enter-
prise, normally over the long run. The success of the enterprise in this
context is most often a function of the entrepreneurial efforts of the
promoter or a third party.
The reality of the marketplace is that nearly all businesses ultimately
finance themselves by obtaining public funds through the sale of goods
or services. Whenever some future performance is promised a cus-
tomer of an enterprise, there is a commercial risk that the promisor will
not perform or that the intervening insolvency of the promisor will pre-
vent or delay performance. These types of "normal" commercial risks,
without more, do not shift the principal risk of the enterprise to the
customer. Nevertheless, every lender of money is, in one sense, an in-
vestor since he places his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the
form of interest.
Within the commercial/consumer-investment dichotomy the ex-
tremes are conceptually definable: buying shares of common stock of a
publicly held corporation, where the impetus for the transaction derives
from the person with the money, is clearly an investment; borrowing
money from a bank to finance the purchase of an automobile, where
the impetus for the transaction comes from the person who needs the
money, is a loan. In between is a vast gray area which has been, and
must be in the future, subject to a case-by-case analysis.
For example, if an undercapitalized entity should impose itself in the
midst of an investment risk which emanates from the marketplace, risk,
both of loss and to expectation interest, may be fundamentally altered.
No longer will the risk to the investor be subject only to the market-
place; rather, the investor's risk will now be contingent upon the chang-
ing fortunes of his middleman, much as if he had purchased common
stock. The investor will be looking to the middleman for the realiza-
tion of his profit expectation interest. Utilizing this type of risk analy-
sis, the purpose of the scheme is to obtain venture capital and shift the
risk to the investor. The investor becomes a passive financer of the
enterprise and should be entitled to the protection of the securities
laws.
The analysis focuses on risk associated with success or failure of the
venture; not the risk of loss of initial investment, but risk, in the sense
of opportunity cost, of not achieving the profit expectation because con-
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trol of the venture is in the hands of others. The investor, who is pro-
viding funds to an enterprise expecting profits from the efforts of the
promoter of the enterprise or a third party, is bearing the risk of not
achieving his profit expectation because he does not have control over
the venture. Analytically, risk of denial of gain equates to a profit ex-
pectation without the effective control over the venture to be responsi-
ble for the profit realization.
Yet, risk to expectation interest is not a major analytical element in
evaluating a transaction as a security under the Howey/Forman test.
Rather, risk to expectation interest is a result or forced conclusion from
an analysis that turns upon who is to perform those efforts that may
lead to the success or failure of the venture. For example, in the prom-
issory note context, the analysis again turns on whether the lender is
providing funds to a venture and seeking a return from the efforts of
others. If so, the transaction is an investment.
A number of Supreme Court cases, however, have been based on the
issue of risk of loss. These decisions are prior to Forman. One need
only look to the Joiner decision to recognize that the case turned not so
much on the promoter's representations of profit as on the economic
reality that the risk of loss had been placed on the shoulders of the
investor.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's concern in SEC v. Variable Life In-
surance Co. of America"6 and SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Co. 37 is clearly directed at the insurer's attempt to shift all or a substan-
tial portion of the risk of loss in a variable annuity transaction to the
investor.
After Forman, it can be argued that the variable annuity cases are sul
generis and do not affect the general conclusion of this article that risk
of loss is only a useful analytical took in analyzing the commer-
cial/investment nature of a transaction and not a prerequisite to the
finding of a security. The Joiner decision may be viewed as emphasiz-
ing the use of risk of loss as an evidentiary consideration; that is, risk of
loss of initial investment is useful in analyzing the economic realities of
a transaction to determine whether the transaction is in the nature of an
investment. If such is the case, the last element of Howey is then con-
sidered. The finding of risk of loss will normally lead to the conclusion
35. As Professor Coffey observed about the Joiner opinion:
The court's concern is clearly focused on the relationship between the success of the
enterprise and the preservation or deterioration of the value which the buyer originally
furnished in the alleged security transaction.
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula? 18 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 367, 381 (1967) (emphasis in original).
36. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
37. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
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that an investment transaction is present. Risk of loss is often present
in commercial transactions such as risky loans, and, therefore, the dis-
tinction is the expectation of profits in reliance on the efforts of another.
Absence of a risk of loss of initial investment, however, will not pre-
clude the finding of an investment contract security. Given the ele-
ments of Howey, primarily the expectation of profits in reliance on the
efforts of others, the federal test after Forman will find the presence of a
security even if there is no risk of loss of initial investment.
Moreover, an analysis of the "shifting of risk" without a correlative
analysis of who is responsible for those significant managerial efforts
that will determine the success or failure of the enterprise, will analyti-
cally equate with a "risk capital" theory rather than "venture capital,"
which is not federal law. Forman stressed the importance not only of
"profits" and the control of the capital markets as the primary purpose
of the Securities Acts, but also the expectation of those profits from the
entrepreneurial efforts of others. Forman stands for the proposition
that in the absence of the third element of Howey, with the first two
elements determined under the economic realities standard, the shifting
of business risk or risk of loss alone will not render a given transaction
a security.
APPLYING THE HOWEY/FORMAN TEST
A. Substance Over Form
The Supreme Court in Forman rejected a literal approach to analyz-
ing whether a transaction constituted a security. In the context of
"stock," the Court adopted the economic realities standard.38 This test
looks to "the economic realities underlying a transaction and not [to]
the name appended thereto."39
Applying this economic realities standard to the facts of Forman, the
Court found that none of the usual characteristics of stock were associ-
ated with the shares in the cooperative apartments. For example, the
shares carried no rights to dividends; they were nonnegotiable; the
shares could not be hypothecated; the instrument conferred no voting
rights proportioned to the number of shares owned and the shares
could not appreciate in value. The Supreme Court, therefore, con-
38. 421 U.S. at 849. However, in the recent case of Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 502
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-13 (5th Cir. 1979), the court did not believe that participating in
the management of a closely held business, acquired through the purchase of common stock,
rather than awaiting profits derived "solely from the efforts of others" as required by Howey,
denied the purchasers of ordinary common stock the protections of the antifraud provisions of
federal law. Distinguishing Forman, Judge Butzner observed: "Having decided to deal in stock,
they brought their transaction under the federal securities laws."
39. Id, accord, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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cluded that the purchasers' intent was to obtain housing rather than to
make an investment for profit.40
The rejection of the literal test is most significant with regards to
transactions falling under the language of Section 2(1) of the Securities
Act. For example, in the case of promissory notes, many cases have
employed a variant of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's "plain meaning" con-
struction4 holding that when the statute read "'security' means any
note. . ." it meant just that.4 2 Rejection of the literal test means that
an instrument or document, such as a promissory note exceeding a
nine-month term, is not to be deemed a security on its face. With this
decision, the Supreme Court has indicated its view that the economic
realities of the transaction must be considered by a court before reach-
ing its conclusion.
B. Common Enterprise
After rejecting the literal test and concluding under the economic
realities standard that the rights, preferences, privileges, and restric-
tions on the purchasers of apartments were not those of purchasers of
common stock, the Supreme Court then considered whether the shares
were "investment contracts" under the Howey test.
Clearly, in the Forman case the purchasers of apartments were in-
vesting money. This is seldom a meaningful debate in a securities anal-
ysis.43 As an analytical matter the first element of the Howey test is
40. 421 U.S. at 852-53.
41. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1947).
42. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1970); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey
Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a'd 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
43. A determination of what may constitute an "investment" for the purpose of the Howey
test was significant in the recent case of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979). In this case the
Supreme Court held that, in the context of a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan, an em-
ployee sold his labor to obtain a livelihood, not to make an investment. In reaching this position,
the Court reviewed its previous decisions which have recognized the presence of a "security,"
noting that in all such cases the person found to have been an investor chose to give up a specific,
tangible, or definable consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the characteris-
tics of a security. The Court did, however, note that a person's "investment," in order to meet the
definition of an investment contract, need not take the form only of cash, but can also be other
goods and services, citin& Forman at 852 n.16.
It should also be kept in mind that the term "investment" as used in the Howey test, although
infrequently discussed by the courts, is not the same as a speculative investment where there is
substantial danger of loss of principal. This ties back to the discussion above as to whether risk in
the context of the Howey/Forman test is the risk associated with risk of loss of initial investment
or whether, as is contended here, it is the risk associated with opportunity cost and the failure to
achieve profit expectation in reliance upon the efforts of others. Investment in the context of the
federal securities laws involves nothing more than the turnover of consideration for the expecta-
tion of gain. As stated in the case of SEC v. Wickham:
The placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or
profit from its employment is an "investment" as that word is commonly used and un-
derstood.
12 F. Supp. 245, 247 (D. Minn. 1935).
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presupposed.
The second element of the Howey test focuses on the nature of the
investment venture, ie., is the individual investor part of a "common
enterprise." As developed by the federal courts, a common enterprise
need not be a common fund. The term denotes an interdependence of
fortunes: a dependence by one party for his profits on the success of
some other party in performing his part of the venture.' The federal
cases clearly show that a common enterprise is not dependent upon the
interrelated success of all investors in the common enterprise. Rather,
it will suffice for this element of the Howey test if an investor's success
is dependent upon the success of the promoter, as, in turn, is the success
of all other investors.
An excellent discussion of the federal cases that have considered the
question of common enterprise is contained in the recent decision of
the Washington Supreme Court-MeClelland v. Sundholm.45 The
Sundholm court concluded that a common enterprise existed in the sale
of silver bullion for investment purposes, and determined the sale to be
a security under Washington State's securities act.46 The Washington
Supreme Court held, citing the federal precedents, that there was suffi-
cient dependence to find a common enterprise.47 The investor expected
to gain a profit from his investment only if the defendant-trading cor-
poration wisely managed its own silver selection, purchase, and resale
activities. The intended ongoing relationship between the purchaser
and the trading company emphasized the existence of a common enter-
prise. Consequently, the market, and the reliance of all investors on
the trading company thereby constituted a common enterprise.48
Other courts have held that "common enterprise" should be liberally
construed to mean any type of concerted effort whereby the investors'
financial interests are "inextricably interwoven" 49 with those of the
promoter or third party. 0 In other words, the element of commonality
is vertical between buyer and seller-not horizontal-among investors
similarly situated.5'1 As stated in the case of Jones v. International Inves-
44. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); accord, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 1974).
45. 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
46. Id. at 529, 579 P.2d at 373-74.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961).
50. For an excellent discussion of common enterprise, see Continental Marketing Corp. v.
SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
51. The federal courts are, however, inconsistent as to other types of "common" transactions.
(a) In Maheu Y. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court held that a discre-
tionary commodities account, managed and supervised by defendants, constituted an investment
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tors, Inc. East:
[I]t is well settled in this circuit that the fact that one investor's return
is independent of that of other similar investors does not preclude
satisfaction of the common enterprise element, if the fortunes of all
the investors are, in the last analysis, dependent upon the efficacy of
the promoter's efforts. Thus, it is not significant whether the profits
of the enterprise will be pooled and distributed among all the inves-
tors and the promoter, but rather the emphasis should be on "the
uniformity of the impact of the promoter's efforts" on the fate of all
investors.
52
Upon review of the case authority, however, the "common enter-
prise" element of the Howey test has not been a significant factor in
determining whether a transaction constitutes an investment contract.
The courts have structured a priority analysis out of the Howey criteria:
whether or not a transaction meets the Howey test will most often de-
pend on the element of "profits from the efforts of another" and not on
the issue of "common enterprise." Should a court hold that insufficient
managerial efforts are to be performed by the purchaser who expects
profits, confusion in the law as to the definition of "common enter-
prise" will not preclude a court from determining that a security exists.
contract, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff's account was not pooled with that of other inves-
tors. Contrary is the case of Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), which held, by opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, that an individual
who, for a fee, invests his client's money in a commodities market, was not selling a security
within the meaning of the Securities Act. This court found that even though the defendant in-
vested the money at his own discretion, the element of commonality necessary to constitute an
investment contract was missing:
Although the complaint does allege that Nelson entered into similar discretionary ar-
rangements with other customers, the success or failure of those other contracts had no
direct impact on the profitability of plaintiff's contract. Nelson's various customers were
represented by a common agent, but they were not "joint participants in the same invest-
ment enterprise."
457 F.2d at 276-77, accord, Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgen Inc., 59 F.R.D. 128, 131-32 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). Cf. Consolo v. Homblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, 436 F. Supp. 447, 453 (1976).
(b) Another point on which the courts are divided is whether a common enterprise can exist
between a promoter and one investor. In the case of Sunshine Kitchens v. .41anthus Corp., 403 F.
Supp. 719 (1975), a purchaser of computers under an agreement whereby the seller would manage
leasing arrangements brought suit charging the seller with violation of the securities laws. The
court held that a common enterprise which will constitute a transaction a security within the
securities laws does not exist where there is only one investor and one promoter. Id. at 721-22.
The court held, citing Koscot and SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974), that those courts dealt with schemes involving hundreds of investors. Those courts were not
primarily interested in whether the money or profits were pooled. They were interested, however,
and found to be a critical factor, "the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts."
Contrary to the holding in Sunshine is the case of Huberman v. Dennys Restaurants, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In this case the purchase and sale of a restaurant property consti-
tuted the purchase and sale of a security if, as alleged, the lease package was put together by the
lessee and vendor and offered as an investment to the purchaser where it was not intended that the
purchaser participate in the operation of the franchise held by the lessee. And if rental, above
monthly minimum, depended upon the volume of the restaurant's sales, so that there existed the
elements of common enterprise and complete reliance by the purchaser upon the efforts of others
for her profits.
52. 429 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (citations deleted).
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On the other hand, should a court hold that the significant managerial
efforts that determine the success or failure of the profit expectation
interest are to be performed by the investor in an enterprise, then the
court will rarely, if ever, address the question of common enterprise.
C Led to Expect Profits Solely From the Efforts of the Promoter or
A Third Party
The most important conclusion of the Court was that the third ele-
ment of the Howey test was not met because the "shareholders" did not
expect to realize profits from the entrepreneurial efforts of others.
For analytical purposes, it is best to split this third element of the
Howey test into the profit expectation interest and the reliance on the
efforts of another. As to the profit expectation interest, as discussed
above, the Forman Court was quite clear in what Howey meant by
profits. Profits are to be capital appreciation or participation in earn-
ings resulting from the use of investors' funds and not tax deductions
or, by analogy, membership rights in a country club. It is this defini-
tion of profits that precludes adoption by the federal courts of Sobieski
in its entirety for Sobieski does not require such a profit expectation but
merely a risk-benefit analysis.
As to the realization of profits from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, although not specifically adopted in the Forman decision,
an analysis of such efforts no longer hinges on the word "solely" con-
tained in the original Howey formulation. The analysis is now based
on whether the "essential" or "undeniably significant" efforts of per-
sons other than the investor determine the success of the enterprise.53
Control over management seems to be the key. Neither a general
partnership nor a joint venture interest has been held to be a security
since effective management control is in the hands of the "investor."54
Therefore, the third element of Howey becomes the major focus of
the Howey/Forman test. Investment and common enterprise, although
necessary elements, usually are not significant in analyzing a transac-
tion and may not even be directly considered under the "economic re-
alities" standard. It is profit expectation in reliance on others that now
differentiates a security from other commercial or consumer transac-
tions; and, after Forman, is applicable to all transactions, whether
traditional investment contracts or other types of securities under Sec-
tion 2(1) of the Securities Act. Finally, this third element of Howey
directs the analysis to the risk of denial of profit expectation because
53. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. Hirsch v. DuPont, 396 F.2d 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (general partnership); Polikoffv. Levy,
et al., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,513 (Il. App. 1965) (joint venture).
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the investor does not effectively control the enterprise. The result is not
a federal risk capital test but a venture capital test.
CONCLUSION
The Forman decision, as perhaps the most significant decision defin-
ing securities for the purposes of federal law since Howey, effectively
tied together the various tests used by the federal courts since Howey in
defining securities. The "literal test" was rejected as too superficial and
the "economic realities" standard approved. Beyond that, the Forman
decision integrated the third element of the Howey formulation and the
economic realities standard, which together constitute the
Howey/Forman test. Finally, the Supreme Court stated that this test
should be applied to all types of investment transactions coming within
the definition of a security in Section 2(1) of the Securities Act and not
just "investment contracts."
Perhaps this new Howey/Forman test will provide some uniformity
to the federal courts as they approach the myriad of schemes and pro-
grams that come before them. The test goes clearly to the substance of
the transaction, analyzing the risk of the venture and whether the indi-
vidual responsible for success or failure, given the risk, is the investor
or the promoter. But the Court also drew limits to this analysis by
defining profits and indicating its view of congressional intent behind
the Securities Acts. The purview of federal securities laws is not as
broad as Sobieski, for there must be an expectation of profits, in terms
of capital appreciation or a participation in earnings resulting from the
use of investors' funds, and not merely an expectation of a material
benefit. Further, in addition to profits, the Forman Court requires that
the investor's profit expectation be in reliance on the significant mana-
gerial efforts of the promoter or a third party. Conversely, the
Howey/Torman test is broader than Sobieski because risk, in the sense
of risk capital, although useful in determining whether a transaction is
of an investment character rather than of a commercial character, is not
determinative of the existence of a security.
It is our view that the Supreme Court in Forman not only clarified
the Howey test to provide the courts a clear but flexible framework for
analyzing transactions under the federal securities laws, but the Court
also correctly limited the types of transactions that may now be brought
under the purview of such laws. Any expectation of gain is insufficient
because Forman requires a profit expectation in a traditional economic
sense. The name applied to a transaction is not dispositive. "Risk capi-
tal" is not federal law and the Court's definition of "profits" highlights
the distinction between "risk capital" of Sobieski and "venture capital"
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of the Howey/Forman test. The Supreme Court apparently understood
that if judicial expansion of the scope of the federal securities laws was
left unchecked, few business transactions would escape the label of an
investment contract security. Clearly this was not the intent of the
Congress when it enacted the Securities Act.
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